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Abstract
For many years the importance of sharing
information on cybersecurity risks, vulnerabilities,
and incidents has been understood. Organizations
working in isolation are at a disadvantage when
facing the types of threats existing in today’s Internet
environment. Informal information sharing has been
conducted for many years. More formal information
sharing organizations were created in response to the
1998 Presidential Decision Directive-63. More
recently, Executive Order 13691 called for the
creation of information sharing and analysis
organizations beyond the critical infrastructures and
led to the creation of a standards organization to
create standards, guidelines, and other documents to
assist in the creation of information sharing
organizations. This paper will discuss the history of
information sharing in the United States and will
explain the potential impact for states and
communities. The importance of developing state
and community information sharing organizations
will be discussed along with the challenges in
establishing them.
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1. Introduction
It is not hard to understand the benefit of
information sharing and analysis in defending
computer systems and networks.
An attack
discovered on one organization in a given sector
might, and in fact most likely can, serve as a warning
to others in the same sector. It is reasonable to
assume that, for example, if an attack is occurring on
a financial institution with a new vulnerability, it is
very likely that others will be or already are also
being attacked via the same vulnerability. If the first
institution that detects the attack warns the other,
many that might not have discovered the
vulnerability until much later can address the
problem at a much earlier point in time. It is also
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easy to imagine how sharing between sectors could
also serve to provide similar early warning of attacks
on an operating system or application that is used in
multiple sectors. It might also provide an indication
of an “inordinate interest” in an organization or
geographic jurisdiction (such as a state or
community) which might foreshadow a pending
attack on the initial organization or upon others in the
same sector or geographic region. Organizations that
keep knowledge of attacks and unusual activity to
themselves are actually doing a disservice to the
security community at large.
The benefit in sharing of cybersecurity
information has been recognized since the early days
of the Internet. The earliest attempt to formalize a
method to share cybersecurity information during a
national incident occurred as a result of the Internet
Worm released by Robert Morris. During the
incident pockets of individuals around the country
were attempting to address the incident and develop a
defense for the worm. There were no established
procedures or any formal method to share and
coordinate information and efforts. After the event,
meetings were held to discuss how best to handle
similar situations in the future and in 1988 the
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at
Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) was formed.
The mission has evolved over time and many of the
incident response functions now are part of the USCERT located with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) while the CERT/CC (CERT
Coordination Center) housed at CMU now researches
security vulnerabilities in software products and
works with software vendors to develop methods to
resolve discovered vulnerabilities. They also develop
tools to assist organizations in conducting forensic
examinations and in analyzing vulnerabilities. [1]
The next major advancement in cybersecurity
information sharing organizations was the publication
of Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-63 (PDD-63)
in February, 1998. The subject of this PDD was
broadly critical infrastructure protection. The stated
intent of the PDD was to “assure the continuity and
viability of critical infrastructures.” [2] To do this,
“the United States will take all necessary measures to
swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both
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physical and cyber attacks on our critical
infrastructures … especially our cyber systems.” [2]
Of importance to the discussion of information
sharing, the PDD directed the FBI to expand its
efforts to create a “national warning and information
sharing system” and to “serve as a national critical
infrastructure
threat
assessment,
warning,
vulnerability, and law enforcement investigation and
response entity.” [2] It further encouraged the critical
infrastructures to establish private sector sharing and
analysis centers. These centers are now known as
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs).
There are currently 24 member organizations in the
National Council of ISACs (NCI) primarily covering
the critical infrastructures.
Executive Order (EO) 13636, published in
February, 2013, has the stated goal of improving the
security and resilience of US critical infrastructure.
To achieve this goal, the EO directs governmental
agencies to partner with the owners and operators of
critical infrastructure in order to “improve
cybersecurity information sharing and collaboratively
develop and implement risk‐based standards.” [3]
The first major contribution of EO 13636 is to
increase the volume, timing, and quality of
cybersecurity information sharing. To this end,
DHS’s Enhanced Cybersecurity Services (ECS) was
expanded to include all 16 critical infrastructure
sectors. ECS was also improved to provide near real
time information sharing. Additionally, unclassified
reports of threats to the US homeland are produced
and disseminated in a timely manner to US private
sector entities. Similarly, classified reports are made
available to authorized critical infrastructure entities.
The second major contribution of EO 13696 was
ordering the creation of a technology neutral and
voluntary risk-based Cybersecurity Framework. The
Cybersecurity Framework was developed by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) using voluntary consensus based standards.
The objective of the framework is to provide
standards, guidelines, and practices that are both costeffective and applicable across all critical
infrastructure sectors. [4]
Additionally, EO 13636 also contains provisions
to protect privacy and civil liberties, establishes a
program to promote and incentivize the adoption of
cybersecurity practices, and orders the review of
current cybersecurity regulatory requirements.
Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21),
released at the same time as EO 13636, replaces
HSPD-7 and dictates three strategic imperatives for
the US Federal Government and critical
infrastructure. First, PPD-21 refines the relationships
between the US Federal Government, critical

infrastructure, and State, Local, Tribal, and
Territorial (SLTT) Governments, in order to facilitate
better information sharing and collaboration. The
second strategic imperative is the identification of
requirements to enable the timely, efficient, and
secure exchange of information between all levels of
governments and critical infrastructure owners and
operators.
Finally, PPD-21 “calls for the
implementation of an integration and analysis
function for critical infrastructure that includes
operation and strategic analysis on incidents, threats
and emerging risks.” [5]
The aforementioned Presidential Directives and
Executive Order have been focused on information
sharing between levels governments and critical
infrastructure. However, one important piece of the
information sharing puzzle has been left out, private
sector cybersecurity information sharing. EO 13691
builds on EO 13636 and PPD-21 in order to address
private sector cybersecurity information sharing by
encouraging the development and formation of
Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations
(ISAOs). [6] EO 13691 specifies that ISAOs may be
established as for-profit or nonprofit entities, and
ISAO members may consist of private or public
sector entities, or both. The Executive order calls for
creation of ISAOs in order to promote cybersecurity
information sharing within the private sector,
between the private sector and the government, and
between ISAOs.
EO 13691 instructs DHS to fund the creation of
the “ISAO Standards Organization (SO), which shall
identify a common set of voluntary standards or
guidelines for the creation and functioning of
ISAOs.” [6] The standards developed by the ISAO
SO are required to address the baseline services
offered by ISAOs, and must, at a minimum address
“contractual agreements, business processes,
operating procedures, technical means, and privacy
protections.” [6]
Several provisions to protect privacy and civil
liberties are present in EO 13691. The executive
order specifically instructs the ISAO SO to include
privacy protections, such as minimization, in the
ISAO standards. Additionally, federal agencies
engaged in activities under EO 13691 are directed to
coordinate their activities “with their senior agency
officials for privacy and civil liberties and ensure that
appropriate protections for privacy and civil liberties
are incorporated into such activities.” [6]
Additionally, the ability of the government to
engage in private-public cybersecurity information
sharing between with ISAOs is improved by EO
13691.
The
National
Cybersecurity
and
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) is
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directed to coordinate and collaborate with ISAOs on
cybersecurity information sharing. The NCCIC is
also designated as a critical infrastructure protection
program and is given the authority to enter into
voluntary agreements with ISAOs.

2. EO 13691 and the ISAO SO
As a result of EO 13691, DHS released a call for
proposals to create the ISAO Standards Organization.
A team from UTSA, LMI, and the Retail
Cybersecurity Intelligence Sharing Center (R-CISC)
was selected from the proposals submitted. Based on
the details in the call for proposals and EO 13691, the
ISAO SO has identified its mission as:
Improve the Nation’s cybersecurity posture by
identifying standards and guidelines for
robust and effective information sharing and
analysis
related
to
cybersecurity
risks/incidents and cybersecurity best
practices.
There are some foundational objectives that the
ISAO SO established early. First, the documents
produced must account for a wide range of potential
ISAOs. A one-size-fits-all approach will not work
for the robust ecosystem that it is envisioned for the
ISAOs. The goal is to be as all-inclusive as possible
so that any organization or individual that wants to
participate in the cybersecurity information sharing
program can do so.
A second principle is that the development of the
documents is conducted in an open collaborative
manner. Public comment will always be sought and
anybody can participate in the public forums that are
held periodically throughout the process. The actual
documents are developed utilizing several working
groups made up of volunteers interested in
participating in the creation of the documents that
emerging ISAOs will use. The entire process is
conducted in a very public, open manner.
The third principle is one that has proven to be
very critical. From the start, the standards and
guidelines have been intended to be voluntary. There
will not be a requirement for anybody to form or be
part of an ISAO if they do not want to be part of one.
As a result of interactions with government
departments and the regulator community, some in
industry have been concerned that participation in an
ISAO may become mandatory within certain sectors.
While the ISAO SO cannot prevent the federal
government from creating laws that might move in

this direction, the documents are currently being
developed assuming a completely voluntary model.
In fact, the ISAO SO sees part of its role as
representing the views of the public and emerging
ISAOs to various government agencies, ensuring that
the public has an opportunity to provide input before
laws or regulations are created in the information
sharing space.
The final guiding principle is that documents that
describe methods to conduct information sharing will
take into account the need for confidentiality and
privacy. Organizations who are members of an ISAO
will want to ensure that any sensitive company
information they share with that ISAO will remain
confidential. Similarly, the privacy of individuals
should be protected so that no personally identifiable
information is released to individuals who do not
have a need to view it.
It needs to also be pointed out that the ISAO SO
recognized early in the process that, unlike other
standard development organizations, standards will
make up just one type of document that will be
produced.
EO 13691 states: “ISAO Standards
Organization (SO), … shall identify a common set of
voluntary standards or guidelines for the creation and
functioning of ISAOs pointing out definitively that
more than just standards are expected. In fact, it is
believed that the ISAO SO will produce many more
documents other than what is traditionally viewed as
standards. These other documents may include
discussions about what an ISAO is, how to form one,
guidelines for what to consider in terms of services
an ISAO may want to offer to its members, and
templates for documents that may commonly be
needed by an ISAO.
The ISAO SO formed six working groups to
address various aspects of an ISAO and its creation.
These working groups are made up of volunteers
from government, academia, and industry and have
been tasked with the actual creation of the documents
that will be released by the ISAO SO. The six
working groups are:
Working Group 1: ISAO Creation – This group
was tasked with identifying and capturing the
elements necessary for an interested organization to
stand up an ISAO. These elements will serve as the
basis for creating an ISAO and will have enough
flexibility in design to fit the needs of diverse
interested organizations.
Working Group 2: ISAO Services and
Offerings – Since meeting the needs of its members
will be critical aspect of all ISAOs, being able to
determine what the needs are and what capabilities
are needed to fulfill these needs is critical for all
ISAOs. This working group will identify and capture
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the capabilities necessary for an interested
organization to effectively operate an ISAO. These
services and offerings will support day-to-day
operation of the ISAO and support its main function:
to share and receive cyber information in a timely
and effective manner. Capabilities must allow for the
most basic ISAO and also support more sophisticated
organizations. Not all ISAOs will provide the same
capabilities and at least initially there is no definitive
set of required capabilities for an entity to become
and ISAO.
Working Group 3: Information Sharing –
Obviously what needs to be shared and how will be a
pressing issue that must quickly be addressed by each
ISAO. This group will identify and capture items
and develop the guidance necessary for an interested
organization to effectively share cyber information
(threat indicators, vulnerabilities, and best practices)
within their ISAO or externally).
Working Group 4: Privacy and Security –
There is a lot of concern over the issue of privacy
(and confidentiality) and how information shared will
remain secure and not released to individuals or
organizations that are not authorized access to it. As
a result, this working group was established to
identify and capture the steps to safeguard
information (both proprietary and privacy related).
They will also detail the processes and procedures to
prevent unauthorized release or access to information
not cleared for release and will address how to meet
Federal, State, Local, and Tribal laws regarding
privacy.
Working Group 5: ISAO Support – This
working group is quite a bit different from the others
whose job is the creation of documents to be used by
individuals and organizations forming an ISAO. It
will consist of individuals familiar with the creation
and operation of information sharing organizations
who will work to support emerging ISAOs as they
are created. This working group will work closely
with the ISAO SO in providing this assistance to
emerging ISAOs.
Working Group 6: Government Relations –
While the ISAO SO is not a government entity
(though its funding does come from DHS), the
federal government will play a significant role in
information sharing due to its intelligence gathering
and analysis capability. This working group will
identify and address issues associated with ISAO
interactions with the Intelligence Community, Law
Enforcement, US Regulators, and Homeland
Security. It is expected that this communication will
go both ways in that this working group will provide
information to emerging ISAOs on what programs
exist in the federal government for sharing of

information with industry or the public but it will also
provide feedback to the federal government on
concerns expressed by the ISAOs related to
government programs or capabilities.
Each of the groups have been asked to initially
put together a draft of documents that will be needed
for emerging ISAOs and that falls within the
description of their working groups focus. These
documents will be combined at their initial release to
form what is in essence an ISAO Manual. The initial
release of this document will not be complete but will
provide what is immediately needed by emerging
ISAOs with subsequent versions containing
additional information.

3. The Information Sharing Ecosystem
As the ISAO SO develops the descriptions to
allow for a wide range of ISAOs to be created, it
becomes important to understand how the many
different types will fit into what is being referred to
as the Information Sharing Ecosystem. This is
designed to explain the many different pieces that
make up the ecosystem and how they all fit together
into a unified information sharing program for the
nation. The first part of the ecosystem are the
different categories of ISAOs that may be formed.
The initial capabilities document created by Working
Group 2 identifies four major types of ISAOs which
are:
Category 1: Individuals or Informal Group
Based – This category would include: a selfemployed security consultant; a localized group of
professionals; and a group of security experts rapidly
convened to address a new vulnerability of incident
(in other words an issue-driven ISAO).
Category 2: Industry or Sector-based – This
category would include the existing ISACs, and are
what most individuals think of when ISAOs are
mentioned. While some of the ISAOs created in
Category 1 would be of limited duration, Category 2
ISAOs will be intended to be permanent (or at least
for as long as they meet their members’ needs).
Category 3: Geographically-based – ISAOs in
this category will cross sector boundaries as they
consist of all entities wishing to be members who are
within a specific geographical boundary such as a
city or state.
Category 4: Other – This category will consist
of any ISAO that does not fit neatly into one of the
other categories. It will include such entities as forprofit and not-for-profit ISAO service providers.
Since the creation of an ISAO is voluntary, it is
easy to conceive that not all individuals or
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organizations that are interested in sharing
cybersecurity information will want to form or join
an ISAO. The information sharing ecosystem needs
to take into account this possibility and allow for a
mechanism for all who want to participate in
information sharing to be part of the national
program.
A major player in the ecosystem will be several
agencies within the federal government who are
engaged in cybersecurity information sharing. In
2009, the NCCIC was created in order to analyze
cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities, share timely
and actionable information with partners, and manage
and support response and recovery efforts. The
NCCIC partners with the private sector, critical
infrastructure, SLTT governments, the US federal
government, and international governments. The
NCCIC is a central location that is currently
comprised of four functional branches:
 NO&I - NCCIC Operations & Integration
 US-CERT - United States Computer
Emergence Reediness Team
 ICS-CERT - Industrial Control Systems
Cyber Emergency Response Team
 NCC - National Coordinating Center or
Telecommunications
The premier cybersecurity information sharing
program by DHS is called the Cyber Information
Sharing and Collaboration Program (CISCP) and is
part of the NCCIC. Joining the CISCP is free, and
requires companies to sign a Cooperative Research
and Development Agreement (CRADA). [7]
The flow of information in CISCP is bidirectional. Information shared with DHS is
analyzed, aggregated, and anonymized and then
shared with CISCP partners in the form of indicator
bulletins, analysis reports, priority alerts, and
recommended practices. Indicator bulletins are short
and frequently issued announcements notifying
partners of new threats that are intended to enable
fast action. Analysis reports are an in depth analysis
of a threat, including the activities of the adversary as
well as methods for detecting and defending against
the malicious activity. Priority alerts are intended to
provide an early warning for specific significant
threats. Recommended practices are the result of
aggregating best practices received from CISCP
partners.
Information is shared between CISCP partners
using the Traffic Light Protocol (TLP). TLP helps to
protect sensitive information by clearly defining what
information may be shared with whom. [8]
Information shared using TLP is assigned a specific
color by the originator of the information:



RED – The information is extremely
sensitive and may not be shared with anyone
outside of the specific exchange.
 AMBER – The information sensitive and
should only be shared with members of the
recipient’s organizations that must have the
information in order to act on it.
 GREEN – The information is useful and may
be shared with any participants.
 WHITE – There is no or minimal risk of
misuse and the information may be
distributed to anyone.
A more recently created cybersecurity
information sharing program provided by DHS and
NCCIC is called Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS).
Threat indicators that participants share with the
NCCIC are shared anonymously with all participants
without vetting by DHS in order to maintain faster,
higher volume threat indicator sharing. DHS may, at
their discretion, assign the information a reputation
score if possible. In addition to participant developed
indicators, DHS also develops and shares its own
cyber threat indicators with AIS participants. [9]
AIS is free for private entities, US federal
government, STTLT government, ISACs, ISAOs, as
well as foreign governments and companies. Entities
may participate in AIS by setting up the
infrastructure necessary to connect directly to DHS,
or by joining an ISAO or ISAC that participates in
AIS. Information is shared among participants in
AIS using Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator
Information (TAXII), Structured Threat Information
eXpression (STIX), and CybOX.
TAXII is a set of specifications are used to define
how and what cyber threat information is exchanged.
These specifications are: TAXII overview, services
specification, message binding specifications (e.g.
XML), protocol binding specifications (e.g. HTTP),
query format specifications, and content binding
reference. It is up to each group using TAXII to
decide what specifications best meets their needs.
TAXII is designed to support sharing structured
cybersecurity threat information such as STIX. [10]
STIX is a standardized language that makes use
of CybOX in order to specify cybersecurity threat
information. CybOX is a language for describing
cyber observables. STIX is intended to capture the
full range of possible cybersecurity threat elements
including observables, indicators, incidents, tactics,
techniques and procedures, exploit targets, courses of
action, campaigns, and threat actors. [11]

4. Information Analysis
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Most of the conversation about ISAOs has
centered on the sharing of cybersecurity related
information. This is an important and necessary first
step but the real goal is to provide “actionable
information” to the members of ISAOs. What is
meant by this is that just sharing raw data or even
facts about specific incidents does not immediately
benefit a member of an ISAO. What members want
is an analysis of all of the information gathered and a
distillation of it down to a point that what they
receive is information that they can take action on.
They want to know what it is that they need to be
doing as a result of the information that has been
shared and not simply the large collection of shared
information itself. This will be a major feature of the
ISAOs and the real benefit that they will provide. It
is also where the commercial entities that are forming
to deliver ISAO services can play a critical role.
As in the information sharing aspect of an ISAO,
the amount of analysis will vary between the ISAOs.
While to be considered an ISAO some level of
analysis needs to be accomplished, how detailed that
analysis is will depend on the objectives of the
individual ISAOs and on their services and offerings.
For the more informal ISAOs the analysis could
simply take the form of an email, teleconference, or
simply a bulletin sent to all members. The important
element is again that what is sent should be pertinent
to the members of the ISAO and should discuss what
the members should be doing as a result of the shared
information and analysis.
At the other end of the spectrum, an advanced
ISAO might conduct real-time analysis of ongoing
events and shared information. The ISAO may
employ 24x7 analysts and a Security Operations
Center that monitors the status of the Internet as it
relates to the ISAO members. This again is a place
where potential ISAO service providers could greatly
benefit their ISAO clients since it will be quite
expensive to maintain a 24x7 operation center with
security analysts.
While an ISAO service provider with its own
security analysts will have the ability to determine
what information is critical for the members of an
ISAO, the various federal agencies involved in
information sharing and analysis have access to
information that the commercial entities will often
not have. Though some of the service providers may
argue the opposite is also true, it is hard to argue with
the fact that the various intelligence gathering
agencies of the federal government have resources
that most commercial entities do not have access to.
Sharing of information with the organizations the
federal government has set up to participate in
information sharing efforts can provide a level of

analysis and access to information that otherwise may
not be possible. ISAOs should therefore seriously
consider participating with the programs to share
more detailed and analyzed information established
by these federal agencies. In order to participate,
ISAOs will generally be required to agree to a certain
level of vetting by the federal agency.
For some, submitting to the vetting of their
organization or their members is not something that
they want to do. Indeed, there are many who may not
want to share any of their information with a
government entity at all. Whether this is done or not
is up to the individual ISAOs and their members and
the decision to do so is completely voluntary – there
is no requirement to share with the federal
government if the ISAO and its members do not wish
to share. The hesitation to share, not only with the
federal agencies but with other ISAOs or even
between members of a specific ISAO is often
centered around the desire to ensure privacy and
confidentiality of information. This is one of the
challenges facing emerging ISAOs.

5. Challenges Facing the ISAOs
There are a number of challenges facing
organizations and individuals wishing to form an
ISAO and that face the entire information sharing
ecosystem itself.
Among these challenges are
privacy and confidentiality, trust, scalability,
certification of ISAOs, the willingness to share
information, and the funding of ISAOs. An emerging
ISAO will have to address each of these issues.
Concerns around privacy and confidentiality of
information shared is a major concern to
organizations wanting to participate in an ISAO.
They want to be assured that any information that an
organization shares with others, no matter who those
others are (i.e. other members, other ISAOs, and/or
federal agencies involved in information sharing
programs), will be kept private and confidential and
only released to individuals or organizations that
have a right to have access based on the agreements
that are signed by members of an ISAO. For
purposes of this discussion, the difference between
privacy and confidentiality is that privacy is generally
used in the context of information sharing to mean
personal information about individuals within a
member organization should remain private.
Confidentiality refers to information about the
organizations – information that might give others a
competitive advantage should the information
become public or known to a competitor. How
sensitive this issue is can be seen in the debate that
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surrounded the passing of the Cybersecurity
Information Sharing Act (CISA) in the United States
in 2015. The act was ultimately passed but there was
some significant opposition to it based on the belief
that compliance with the act would provide the
federal government access to personal information
they would otherwise not have had access to.
Subsequent clarification of the provisions of the act
have shown that these concerns were not justified as
the act provided clear guidance on the “scrubbing” of
personal information before any information was
shared with the government. Nonetheless, the debate
that surrounded the passing of the act provides an
indication of just how sensitive of a subject this is.
Trust is another issue that will have to be
addressed by all parties involved in the information
sharing ecosystem. The concern is what level of trust
can be placed in the information that has been
received from another part of the ecosystem. How
reliable is the information that has been shared? Do
the individuals that have provided the information
have a level of expertise to truly understand what
they have reported or is the information they
provided an incorrect understanding of a specific
situation? Is it possible for deliberately false or
misleading information to be inserted into the
ecosystem? If organizations within an ISAO do not
need to be vetted, then is there the possibility that an
ISAO will be formed by individuals hostile to the
information sharing ecosystem and that may then
inject false or misleading information which could
impact the actions of others? While the fact that
these issues are something that needs to be addressed
is well understood, currently the ISAO SO and its
working groups have not developed any guidance on
how trust will be handled. Currently information
shared between ISAOs and federal agencies that have
vetted them are considered to be reliable, as well as
information shared between ISAOs that have
established a relationship of trust. Further trust is left
up to the ISAOs themselves though guidance on this
will be forthcoming.
Some have suggested that a vetting process or
certification of the ISAOs would handle issues of
trust and would provide a level of confidence that
procedures to protect privacy and confidentiality of
information are in place. While this may be true, the
original guidance provided to the ISAO SO is that
ISAOs should be able to self-certify. This obviously
impacts the level of trust that can initially be placed
in any given ISAO. The guidance from the ISAO SO
will allow for self-certification but also being
examined is whether another level of certification
would be beneficial to the program and if so, how
will this certification process be conducted?

Scalability is an issue that can be immediately
seen when discussing the possibility of 100’s or
1000’s of ISAOs emerging. Add to this the fact that
any given individual or organization could potentially
be a member of multiple ISAOs and the possibility of
an overwhelming amount of information being
entered into the ecosystem becomes a real issue. An
overwhelming amount of information will do nothing
to enhance the security of the nation but could in fact
have a negative impact on its overall current security
status. Initially the ISAO SO is suggesting that this
issue be addressed at the individual ISAO level. In
other words, member organizations should not be the
ones that have to face an overwhelming amount of
information but rather the ISAOs themselves. The
members should always only be receiving actionable
information from the ISAO they are a member of.
How the ISAOs will handle the potential for too
much information is an issue that is being addressed
by the ISAO SO but for which there is no current
guidance.
Probably the most basic of issues that the ISAOs
have to overcome is an understanding of why it is
important to share information. For those who have
been heavily involved in cybersecurity for years this
is not as much of an issue, the value of sharing is
fairly clearly understood. Those who do not have an
understanding of the importance, however, need to be
convinced that sharing information about security
indicators and incidents will ultimately be beneficial.
If for no other reason than today it may be one
organization that gets hit, tomorrow it may be a
different organization that first discovers an ongoing
breach.
If everybody shares, then today one
organization may be the beneficiary of such sharing
while tomorrow it may be somebody else. The other
important thing to emphasize is that sharing of
information does not mean a wholesale sharing of all
information about the security status of a company.
Reports can, and should, be sanitized to highlight the
necessary items and not provide confidential
information about a company or its security controls.
The final issue to mention here is a less technical
one but one that will be critical for emerging ISAOs.
This is the funding of ISAOs. The ISACs generally
charge a membership fee for an organization to
receive information for that sector. Organizations
within that sector can determine whether there is a
sufficient value proposition for them to pay that
membership fee. The much more all-inclusive nature
of ISAOs will lead to less formal ISAOs which may
not charge a membership fee. The fee provides for
the funding of full-time analysts and support
personnel. If this level of support is not needed based
on the objectives of a specific ISAO, then funding
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may not be needed and a membership fee may not be
required. On the other hand for members that want
more real-time intensive analysis and actionable
information, the more full-time staff or paid services
will be required. This may impact the services and
offerings that an ISAO develops as some ISAOs
whose membership includes a majority of small
businesses may not be able to charge fees sufficient
to support more extensive analysis services. This
will be up to the individual ISAOs to determine.

6. Current Status
Since the selection of the team to implement the
ISAO SO in October 2015 a lot has been
accomplished. Two major tasks faced the SO at the
outset: 1) to analyze the work that had already
occurred in the ISACs that have been in operation for
more than a decade and the multiple meetings that
were held on the subject of information sharing and
analysis before the selection of the SO; and 2) to
establish the working groups that would be the
‘workhorse’ for the SO and would be the entities that
would actually develop the standards, guidelines, and
other documents. The SO got a quick start by
holding the first of four open, public forums within
45 days of when the grant was awarded. This initial
meeting, held in Tysons, VA, brought individuals
interested in cybersecurity information sharing
together to discuss what had already occurred in the
space and to begin to identify the working groups that
would be formed.
The next public forum was held in San Antonio,
TX, and the most significant part of this meeting was
the opportunity for the recently established six
working groups to meet and discuss their way ahead.
Following this meeting the working groups began the
real work on the first draft documents which were
released for public comment before the 3rd public
forum which was held in Anaheim, CA in May.
Between this 3rd meeting and the 4th meeting, held
back in Tysons, VA in August, the second call for
public comments on the draft documents occurred.
The working groups then considered each of the
public comments received and created the final
version of the initial documents which was released
in September, 2016.
The initial draft documents (which were
developed individually by the different working
groups but which were then combined into a unified
document for the September release) consisted of the
following:
1.

The ISAO categories and capabilities

2.
3.
4.
5.

A model for ISAO interaction
Information collection and dissemination
An examination of ISAO security and
privacy issues
An examination of federal government
programs and services related to information
sharing and analysis

In addition to these documents, a support and
mentoring infrastructure and process was put into
place to assist emerging ISAOs to establish
themselves.
The initial set of capabilities was not considered
to be a definitive list. What it conveyed were
thoughts about what capabilities an ISAO might want
to consider when being established. Further services
and services and offerings will be added as they are
identified which may occur in the next year or may
be added when new technology or approaches are
developed well into the future. The ISAO program is
an ongoing effort without a programmed end date.
Even before the release of the initial document(s),
the ISAO SO began to receive requests by
individuals and organizations to establish new
ISAOs. An outreach and stakeholder engagement
program along with a support function and
mentorship program, were established to work with
these new entities and to publicize the SO and to
advertise the method under which new ISAOs could
be created. At this point, the formation of ISAOs is
moving forward along with the establishment of the
conceptual information sharing ecosystem.
As
expansion continues, work will be accomplished to
address the issues previously mentioned as they arise.

7. Future Timeline and Work
While much has been accomplished in the year
since the creation of the ISAO SO, much still needs
to be accomplished. The challenges previously
mentioned needs considerable work to establish the
information sharing ecosystem that all may
participate in.
The scalability issue and what
information needs to be shared are tied together since
ISAOs want to share only the minimum amount of
information in order to be able to provide the
actionable information their members’ desire. This is
the major issue that needs further work in the future –
devising a plan for sharing information across all
categories of ISAOs across the entire ecosystem will
be a considerable challenge in the future.
Another goal in the future is the expansion of the
number of ISAOs and an expansion of the
membership in existing ISAOs. Ultimately we want
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everybody to be part of the ecosystem at some level.
Their choice will be at what level they will want to
participate in sharing of information.
The current ISAO effort within the United States
has sidestepped the issue of the international nature
of cybersecurity.
Participation of multi-national
corporations in information sharing is understood.
This is already occurring. What has not been
addressed by the ISAO SO and its working groups is
an examination of the laws and requirements in
different countries for privacy, confidentiality, and
the reporting of incidents. Instead, the way the
current documents have been developed is to
emphasize those issues that are considered core
information sharing and analysis leaving countryspecific items to appendices which can be added as
additional countries examine the core principles and
how they relate to each additional country or region.
The focus thus has been on aspects of information
sharing and analysis that is common across
international boundaries.
Finally, the initial grant called for a 5-year effort
but it was quickly realized that for the ISAOs to
survive beyond the 5-year point some long-term
structure needs to be developed with consistent
funding to ensure that future technology that may
impact the current thought on information sharing
and analysis along with changes to laws that might
impact certain countries would need to be
incorporated into the guidance that had been
produced. Who will be responsible for the long-term
sustainment of the ISAO effort?

The process being utilized is an open, public,
collaborative effort and anybody who wishes to be
part of the effort may volunteer to be on one of the
working groups, attend one of the open forum
meetings that are held to provide a forum for the
public to raise concerns or questions about what is
being developed, or through the online comment
process that allows anybody to provide feedback on
the documents that have been developed – especially
during the draft comment phase of the effort. More
information can be found at www.ISAO.org.

8. Conclusion

[8] “Traffic light protocol (tlp) matrix and frequently asked
questions,” https://www.us-cert.gov/tlp, July 2016.

The benefit of cybersecurity information sharing
to prevention, detection, response, and recovery to
cybersecurity incidents has been adequately shown
through the decade-long effort of the current ISACs.
ISACs alone, however, do not cover the entire
landscape of organizations within the country that
need to be participating in information sharing. This
has prompted the development of a standards
organization to address standards and guidelines that
emerging ISAOs will need to incorporate. The ISAO
SO is this organization and it is utilizing working
groups in an open, collaborative, and very public
program to develop the documents needed. This is
an on-going effort though the initial set of documents
has been created.
Much still remains to be
accomplished, and the working groups continue to
expand on the documents that have already been
developed.

[9] “Automated indicator sharing (ais),” https://www.uscert.gov/ais, July 2016.
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